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A Tightrope Over Both Your Houses:
Ensuring Party Participation and
Preserving Mediation’s Core Values
in Foreclosure Mediation
Heather Scheiwe Kulp*
I.

INTRODUCTION

A. The Foreclosure Crisis
The headlines blister with news about the latest number of homes lost to
foreclosure. In 2010, 2.9 million homes received foreclosure filings—a
35.7% increase from 2009 to 2010.1 The foreclosure crisis only accelerated
from there; in 2012, 9.5 million homes were at risk of default and 4 million
homes had been in foreclosure since the crisis began in 2007.2 A 2011
estimate predicted foreclosures would peak in 2013, but the effects—
depressed housing prices, distressed neighborhoods, and downtrodden
families—linger long after.3

*Heather Scheiwe Kulp is the Clinical Fellow at Harvard Law School’s Negotiation and Mediation
Clinical Program. J.D. Northwestern University School of Law; B.A., Saint Olaf College. This
study came from the author’s work at the Center for Conflict Resolution/Resolution Systems
Institute as a Skadden Fellow, a two-year grant funded by the Skadden Fellowship Foundation.
1. Corbett B. Daly, Home Foreclosures in 2010 Top 1 Million this Year, REUTERS (Jan. 13,
2011),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/13/us-usa-housing-foreclosuresidUSTRE70C0YD20110113; Jon Prior, 3.8m Homes to Receive Foreclosure Filing in 2010,
HOUSING WIRE, June 9, 2010, http://www.housingwire.com/articles/8044-realtytrac-38m-homesreceive-foreclosure-filing-2010.
2. Nick Carey, Americans Brace for Next Foreclosure Wave, REUTERS (Apr. 4, 2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/04/us-foreclosure-idUSBRE83319E20120404;
Jessica
Silver-Greenberg, Despite Aid, Borrowers Still Face Foreclosure, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2013, at B1.
3. Joe Weisenthal, Michelle Meyer: Home Prices will Continue to Plunge, and 2012 will be
the Worst Year for Foreclosures in History, BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec. 3, 2011),
http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-12-03/markets/30471154_1_foreclosure-process-homeprices-housing-crisis.

203

Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2014

1

Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 3

The foreclosure crisis certainly impacts the housing market, but
localities are starting to understand that home loss touches every resident,
regardless of the resident’s homeownership status. Borrowers whose homes
are foreclosed upon face years of drastically lowered credit scores, which
greatly reduce the likelihood they will ever obtain a loan.4 Neighborhoods
with only a few foreclosures decreased housing values and increased the
likelihood that more homes in the neighborhood would go into foreclosure.5
Abandoned homes may entice drug dealers and other criminal enterprises to
settle in a neighborhood.6 Cities often increase property taxes to account for
the estimated $30,000 it costs to secure and maintain foreclosed homes.7
Banks in areas with even moderate rates of foreclosure pull back available
resources, further limiting the number of people—including stable middleto upper-middle class families—who qualify for loans.8 Home loss and
decreased access to home ownership send communities into an economic
tailspin. States need solutions to help these localities.
Early in the crisis, which first struck in 2007, states experimented with
advising borrowers, hoping education would remedy, slow, or at least
decrease the impact of the foreclosure crisis on local communities. In early
2008, NeighborWorks America, a congressionally created affordable
housing and community development organization, gave grants to thirty-one
state housing departments to train housing counselors in foreclosure
mitigation.9 In 2008, the hard-hit state of Arizona appropriated $275,000 for
at-risk borrower pre-foreclosure outreach and education. 10 To help
communities buy back foreclosed homes and revamp them into affordable
housing, Boston Community Capital, a non-profit community development
financial institution, began Aura Mortgage Advisors to educate borrowers
4. Les Christie, How Foreclosures Impacts Your Credit Score, CNN (Apr. 22, 2010),
http://money.cnn.com/2010/04/22/real_estate/foreclosure_credit_score/index.htm.
5. WILLIAM C. APGAR, MARK DUDA, & ROCHELLE NAWROCKI GOREY, The Municipal Cost
of Foreclosure: A Chicago Case Study, HOMEOWNERSHIP PRESERVATION FOUNDATION, 55 (2005),
http://www.nw.org/network/neighborworksProgs/foreclosuresolutionsOLD/documents/2005ApgarDudaStudy-FullVersion.pdf.
6. Id. at 11.
7. Id. at 12, app. A.
8. Jody Shenn & John Gittelsohn, Home Buying Gets Tougher as Lenders Restrict FHA
Loans, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 17, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-17/homeownership-gets-harder-for-americans-as-lenders-restrict-fha-mortgages.html.
9. NEIGHBORWORKS AMERICA, National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling Program
Location
of
Awardees
and
Projected
Sub-grantees,
(2008),
http://www.nw.org/network/nfmcp/documents/ProjectedRevised_LocationofNFMCAwardeesandSu
bGrantees.pdf.
10. Foreclosures Affect Everyone, DISTRICT 5 NEWSLETTER (Councilman Claude Mattox,
Phoenix, AZ), June 2008, http://phoenix.gov/district5/news/mc/d5June08.html (last visited Aug. 17,
2012).
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and finance the purchase of foreclosed homes in late 2008.11 Even with
innovative responses, however, the problem did not abate. Cities, counties,
and states sought a more comprehensive way to resolve the foreclosure
crisis: foreclosure mediation.
B. Mediation to Mitigate the Crisis
Mediation, a process by which a neutral third party facilitates discussion
between parties about their conflict and their options for resolution, 12
appealed to those looking to manage the foray.13 States and municipalities
noticed how well mediation worked to manage other large-scale crises.14
They also recognized that courts have successfully used mediation to reduce
caseloads and help litigants reach their own resolutions for decades.15
Why has mediation been successful in those contexts? Qualities that
distinguish the mediation process from other dispute resolution processes,
set forth particularly well in the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators,
lend support to resolving these conflicts in a mutually satisfactory way.16
Mediation, a voluntary and confidential discussion between disputants
facilitated by a competent and neutral person, gathers invested parties to

11. Foreclosure
Relief,
BOSTON
COMMUNITY
CAPITAL,
http://www.bostoncommunitycapital.org/what/foreclosure-relief (last updated 2011).
12. Though processes vary, basic mediation includes: (1) describing the process, (2) telling the
story from each party’s perspective, (3) exchanging information, (4) identifying the issues, (5)
bargaining and generating options, and (6) reaching an agreement. Jennifer Stepp, How Does the
Mediation Process Work?, MEDIATE.COM (Feb. 2003), http://www.mediate.com/articles/steppJ.cfm
(last visited Aug. 17, 2012).
13. See, e.g., Gerald Lebovits & Lucero Ramirez Hidalgo, Alternative Dispute Resolution in
Real Estate Matters: The New York Experience, 11 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 437 (2010)
(discussing the benefits of mediation for real estate situations, particularly foreclosures).
14. See, e.g., Joyce Hoelting, Lessons Learned from 22 Years of Debt Mediation, FED.
RESERVE
BANK
OF
MINNEAPOLIS
(May
1,
2009),
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=4193 (discussing the farmlender mediation program begun during the 1980s farm crisis); Susan Zuckerman, Mediation
Program Helps Miss. and La. Rebuild After Katrina and Rita, 61 (3) DISPUTE RESOLUTION
JOURNAL 1 (2006), https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_004328 (outlining the
insurance mediation program initiated after Hurricane Katrina).
15. See an extensive database of state and federal court mediation programs at COURT ADR
ACROSS THE U.S., http://courtadr.org/court-adr-across-the-us/ (last visited June 3, 2014).
16. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (2005), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/dispute/documents/model_standards_conduc
t_april2007.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter MODEL STANDARDS].
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focus on one matter for a discrete period of time.17 The mediator assists the
parties in articulating their own needs and interests, and then works with
them to develop a consensus that meets some or all of those needs.18 A
competent, impartial mediator helps balance power dynamics between
parties and promotes equal communication.19 The discussion is not limited
to issues relevant in a court proceeding, so the mediator can also address
emotions that may arise in a conflict, recognizing them and addressing the
deeper issues to which they may point. 20 As a confidential process,
mediation also promotes open, candid communication about a problem and
its potential solutions. 21 Mediation provides parties with the ability to
determine their own outcome, rather than have a court or other
administrative body decide the dispute for them.22
These characteristics make mediation a promising process to mitigate
the foreclosure crisis. Mediation offers an opportunity for personal
communication between a lender representative—a servicer 23 —and a
borrower. In mediation, the borrowers and servicers can explore options for
settlement, including options for the borrower to retain his or her home. The
neutral can help balance power dynamics between a large corporation and a
single borrower by asking questions that an adjudicator cannot. A trained,
impartial person can also acknowledge and work with emotions that may
arise—anger, frustration, sorrow, etc.—whereas those emotions would be
irrelevant in court. Finally, mediation is confidential; borrowers may not
want their financial information public, and servicers may not want their
offers to set precedent for other agreements.
Perhaps these benefits, coupled with the foreclosure crisis’s place in the
political limelight, are why foreclosure mediation programs are developing
17. Michael Leathes, Stop Shoveling Smoke! Give Users a Classic Definition of Mediation,
MEDIATE.COM (Sept. 2011), http://www.mediate.com/articles/LeathesM3.cfm.
18. Frequently Asked Questions About Mediation, ALLIANCE FOR EDUCATION IN DISPUTE
RESOLUTION, http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/alliance/resources/basics/Mediation_FAQ.htm (last updated
Oct. 12, 2005).
19. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 16, at 4, 5.
20. Melinda S. Gehris, Good Mediators Don’t Ignore Emotion, 46 NEW HAMPSHIRE BAR J. 28
(2005).
21. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 16, at 6; Lawrence Freedman, Confidentiality: A Closer
Look, in CONFIDENTIALITY IN MEDIATION: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE (1985).
22. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 16, at 3-4.
23. Throughout this article, I will use the term “servicer” to indicate a representative for the
lender’s interests. Sometimes, the representative is the original lender. Often, though, the original
lender has sold the mortgage loan one or more times to other entities and/or has hired an entity to
service the loan while the lender still holds the actual loan. Thus, the title “servicer” is more
appropriate than “bank” or “lender” to indicate the party that will appear to represent the interests of
those who own the loan debt. I will also use “borrower” to indicate a representative for the person or
persons who received the mortgage loan.
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at a much more rapid rate than other court- or government-approved
mediation program. Since 2007, over twenty-five states, counties, or
municipalities adopted a form of foreclosure mediation as part of the state’s
judicial24 or non-judicial25 foreclosure process.26 While program structures,
goals, and outcomes differ greatly, such general enthusiasm about mediation
is refreshing, especially for longtime advocates who struggle to ignite
interest in mediation programs as a pathway to justice for low-income
individuals. 27 However, there is tension between foreclosure mediation
program administrators’ desires to ensure equal bargaining and worthwhile
party participation, and the established role of the mediator.
The purpose of this article is to describe and analyze current efforts to
address the nation’s foreclosure crisis through the use of mediation, and to
offer guidance concerning mediation program design elements that will best
satisfy competing goals. In Part I, I describe the foreclosure crisis and
current mediation programs. I highlight a particular tension between
mediation’s core values of confidentiality and self-determination and one
foreclosure dispute resolution program’s focus on holding parties
accountable for undesirable behavior. In Part II, I describe three levels of
accountability in current foreclosure mediation programs, from objective to
subjective: attendance of specified parties, exchange of documentation, and
participation in good faith. These contrast with the priorities and rules under
which court-connected mediation has historically operated. Part III explores
the inherent conflict between mediation’s traditional values and foreclosure
mediation programs that hold parties accountable for following a particular
standard. Part IV proposes practical dispute system design elements that

24. Some states require foreclosures to be filed in state court. Judicial foreclosure states that
have developed local or statewide foreclosure mediation include: Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and Vermont.
25. Some states do not require foreclosures to be filed in state court. Instead, the foreclosure
notice is sent directly to the borrower, then a sale of the property is scheduled. Usually, there is no
government interaction in the process until the foreclosure sale is completed. Non-judicial
foreclosure states that have developed local or statewide foreclosure mediation include: Arizona, the
District of Columbia, Hawaii, Iowa, Massachusetts, Nevada, Rhode Island and Washington.
26. See Heather Scheiwe Kulp, Foreclosure Dispute Resolution Program Models State-byState,
RESOLUTION
SYSTEMS
INSTITUTE,
http://www.aboutrsi.org/pfimages/ForeclosureMediationProgramModels_September2012.pdf (last
updated Sept. 19, 2012) [hereinafter Models].
27. See, e.g., Susan M. Yates, Accessing Justice through Mediation: Pathways for Poor and
Low-Income
Disputants,
CENTER FOR ANALYSIS OF COURT ADR SYSTEMS.
http://courtadr.org/files/AccessingJustice.pdf (last visited June 3, 2014).
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will balance the benefits of accountability with the core values that make
mediation a meaningful, effective dispute resolution method.
II. MEDIATION AS A RESPONSE TO THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS
A. Mediation’s Core Values and Recent Foreclosure Mediation Case Law
Some states have codified mediation’s core principles, including
confidentiality,28 by adopting the Uniform Mediation Act (UMA).29 While
the Model Standards mandates that mediators “maintain the confidentiality
of all information obtained by the mediator in mediation, unless otherwise
agreed to by the parties or required by applicable law,”30 the UMA further
restricts disclosure of mediation communications, either to an adjudicative
body (privileged communication) 31 or to anyone outside of mediation
(confidential communication). 32 As in the Model Standards, mediation
communications are confidential to the degree the parties agree to or as
dictated by state law,33 but the UMA also dictates that a mediator cannot
disclose mediation communications to any authoritative body that may
render a decision about the dispute with very limited exceptions.34
Of particular relevance to the foreclosure mediation context, the UMA
prohibits mediators from making “a report, assessment, evaluation,
recommendation, finding, or other communication regarding a mediation to
a court, administrative agency, or other authority that may make a ruling on
the dispute that is the subject of the mediation.”35 The mediator may only

28. Uniform
Mediation
Act,
§§
7-8,
available
at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/mediation/uma_final_03.pdf
(last
revised
2003)
[hereinafter UMA].
29. Eleven states have adopted the UMA, drafted in 2001 by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association Section of Dispute
Resolution as a standard for mediation practice in state courts. David A. Hoffman, Introduction:
Uniform Mediation Act Symposium Issue, 61 J. DISP. RES. 1, 1 (2003), available at
http://bostonlawcollaborative.com/blc/61-BLC/version/default/part/AttachmentData/data/2005-07intro-uma-symposium.pdf?branch=main&language=default. The Act has been adopted in District of
Columbia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and
Washington.
UNIFORM
LAW
COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Mediation+Act (last visited June 3, 2014).
30. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 16, at 6.
31. UMA, supra note 28, at §§ 4-7.
32. UMA, supra note 28, at § 8
33. UMA, supra note 28, at § 8.
34. UMA, supra note 28, at §§ 4(a), 7(a). Exceptions are enumerated in § 6.
35. UMA, supra note 28, at § 7(a).
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report attendance, whether a mediation session occurred, and whether a
settlement was reached, but not the terms of the settlement.36
Some states did not adopt the UMA, but rather created their own
mediation standards or had the court create mediation standards.37 Even in
states without codified mediator standards, some mediation programs,
including foreclosure mediation programs, 38 have adopted the Model
Standards. Most mediators operate under a general understanding and
acceptance of these principles.
While many of the accepted mediation principles, including
confidentiality, complement and enhance a process by which servicers and
borrowers meet to discuss resolutions to foreclosure, those responding to the
foreclosure crisis sometimes overlook such principles in the interest of
responding to legitimate concerns about the foreclosure crisis. As a
consequence, some stakeholders have insisted on goals that conflict with
mediation’s core principles and jeopardize the integrity of the mediation
process.39
36. UMA, supra note 28, at § 7(b)(1); Florida’s Supreme Court clarified its mediation
reporting requirement after foreclosures mediators were reporting that parties “reached impasse with
a plan of action.” The clarification was to remove such a reporting option and allowing mediators to
indicate only that there was an agreement or no agreement. Supreme Court of Florida, In Re:
Guidance Concerning Managed Mediation Programs for Residential Mortgage Foreclosure Cases,
Admin.
Order
No.
AOSC10-57,
4
(2010),
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/clerk/adminorders/2010/AOSC10-57.pdf.
37. See, e.g., CODE OF CONDUCT FOR MAINE JUDICIAL BRANCH ADR NEUTRALS (2001),
available at http://www.courts.state.me.us/court_info/adr/pdf/code_of_conduct.pdf; Cassel v.
Superior Ct., 51 Cal.4th 113 (Cal. 2011). A discussion of the varying state principles around
mediation confidentiality can be found in Richard C. Reuben & Nancy H. Rogers, Choppy Waters
for a Movement Toward Uniform Confidentiality Privilege, 5 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 2 (1998).
38. See generally MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 16; see, e.g., Order Amending Foreclosure
Mediation Rules, ADKT 435, NEV. S.C. R. 4(2) (2012) (explaining revised requirement that Nevada
Foreclosure Mediation Program mediators comply with the Model Standards).
39. Many states or localities that have instituted foreclosure mediation programs have little or
no experience with mediation. For instance, Iowa offers some mediation programs in some
localities, but has no statewide office or programs. See generally Paul C. Gomez et al., Evaluation
of the Iowa Alternative Dispute Resolution Programs, NAT’L CENTER FOR STATE COURTS (1998).
Yet, Iowa was the first state to consider mediation as a way to assist the court’s foreclosure docket.
Bob Brammer, Miller Organizes Mortgage Foreclosure Project to Prevent Flood of Foreclosures,
IOWA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sept. 11, 2007),
http://www.iowa.gov/government/ag/latest_news/releases/sept_2007/Foreclosure_Hotline.html.
Some states with foreclosure mediation, including California and Florida, have extensive courtconnected mediation programs and supplemented existing programs with additional rules and staff to
support adding foreclosure mediation. See, e.g., Civil ADR / Alternative Dispute Resolution Options,
SUPERIOR
COURT
OF
CALIFORNIA,
COUNTY
OF
SAN
DIEGO,
http://www.sdcourt.ca.gov/portal/page?_pageid=55,1555034&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL
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In 2009, Nevada’s legislature passed Assembly Bill 149, which created a
statewide foreclosure mediation program to “address the foreclosure crisis
head-on with the hope of keeping Nevada families in their homes.”40 Two
months into the program, there were 1,171 mediations requests.41 Also, two
months into the program, the Supreme Court was already exploring changes
to the rules, prompted by Assemblywoman Barbara Buckley reporting that
servicers were participating in “bad faith.”42
Under the original program rules, the mediators could stop a mediation
if they believed a party was acting in bad faith, but they could not issue a
report to any entity about the quality of mediation participation.43 This was
consistent with Nevada’s Rules Governing Alternative Dispute Resolution,
which state that all oral or written communication in a mediation, other than
an agreement, is confidential and a mediator cannot disclose those
communications in a subsequent proceeding.44 But at the prompting of
borrower advocates, including Assemblywoman Buckley, the Supreme Court
changed the rule. In 2010, the mediator gained the ability to report a
servicer’s bad faith participation to the court and to make a recommendation
for sanctions to the judge. 45 The Supreme Court also changed the
confidentiality provision to allow for this reporting and to allow the use of
any other documents or communication in mediation in a review of bad faith
participation.46 While the parties could request that the judge adjudicate the

(last visited June 3, 2014); What ADR Options are Available?, SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, https://apps2.alameda.courts.ca.gov/adr/Default.aspx (last visited June 3,
2014); Earnestine Reshard, Florida Mediation & Arbitration Programs: A Compendium, FLORIDA
DISPUTE RESOLUTION CENTER (2009-10), http://www.flcourts.org/core/fileparse.php/254/urlt/0910FYDRCCompendium.pdf.
40. STATE
OF
NEVADA
FORECLOSURE
MEDIATION
PROGRAM,
http://foreclosure.nevadajudiciary.us/ (last visited June 3, 2014).
41. Buck Wargo, Nevada’s Top Court Considers Rule Changes for Foreclosure Mediation,
LAS VEGAS SUN (Sept. 18, 2009), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2009/sep/18/foreclosuremediation/.
42. Id. Bad faith and good faith participation are difficult to define, as will be discussed later.
It is often a subjective standard, meaning a person other than the parties must determine whether
someone is participating in good faith. This threatens the neutrality of the mediator, as the mediator
becomes more of a judge than a neutral.
43. Id.
44. Order Adopting Rules Governing Alternative Dispute Resolution and Nevada Mediation
Rules and Amending the Nevada Arbitration Rules and Nevada Short Trial Rules, § C, R. 11(A)
(March 3, 2005), http://www.leg.state.nv.us/CourtRules/RGADR.html.
45. Nev. Assemb.
Bill 149(1)(5) (2009) (amended 2011), available at
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/75th2009/Bills/AB/AB149_EN.pdf.
46. Nevada Supreme Court Order Adopting Foreclosure Mediation Rules R. 18 (amended
Sept. 1, 2013), available at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/CourtRules/FMR.html.
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issue of bad faith participation, the new rules stop short of allowing the
parties to make a record from the mediation for this purpose.47
In 2011, the Nevada Supreme Court took mediator reporting even
further. On July 7, 2011, the Court decided three cases about practices
within the Nevada Mortgage Foreclosure Mediation Program.48 The cases
involved borrowers who had exercised their right to request that a judge
adjudicate the issue of a servicer’s bad faith participation. In each case, the
judge did not find the servicer’s actions49 rose to the level of bad faith.50 On
appeal, the Court found the servicer’s actions did constitute bad faith,51 but
the Court’s decision went even further. Not only did the Court implicitly
affirm that mediators may report on specific party behavior or
communication that supports bad faith participation, but it also mandated
that mediators recommend sanctions for those behaviors.52 The Court now
requires judges to take the mediator’s report as conclusive evidence of bad
faith participation and sanction parties accordingly.53
Of course, mediation program administrators want to encourage party
attendance and full participation; a mediation program with only one party
or limited negotiation is no program at all.54 However, the requirement that
judges must now comply with mediators, while in the interest of keeping

47. Austin Kilgore, Nevada Court Extends, Modifies Foreclosure Mediation Program,
HOUSING WIRE (May 7, 2010), http://www.housingwire.com/2010/05/07/nevada-court-extendsmodifies-foreclosure-mediation-program.
48. Leyva v. Nat’l Default Serv. Corp., 255 P.3d 1275 (Nev. 2011) [hereinafter Leyva];
Pasillas v. HSBC Bank USA, 255 P.3d 1281 (Nev. 2011) [hereinafter Pasillas]; Redmon v. HomeQ
Serv., Inc., No. 56358 (Jul. 7, 2011).
49. In Leyva, Wells Fargo, the servicer representative that appeared at mediation, did not
submit copies of mortgage assignments, though Wells Fargo was not the original mortgage holder.
Leyva, supra note 48, at *3-4. In Pasillas, the servicer representative stated at mediation that it was
not counsel for HSBC (the case’s named beneficiary of the mortgage note), which had erroneously
been named trustee, but was counsel for American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc., which was
responsible for the case. Pasillas, supra note 48, at *5. The mediator’s report also stated that the
mortgage note was missing two pages and that the servicer had not conducted a complete appraisal.
Id.
50. Leyva, supra note 48, at *4 (referring to the appellate court’s decision that Wells Fargo
should not be sanctioned because it provided all essential documents); Pasillas, supra note 48, at *5
(referring to the appellate court’s decision that respondents had “met the burden to show cause why
sanctions should not lie”).
51. Leyva, supra note 48, at *14; Pasillas, supra note 48, at *8, 13.
52. Pasillas, supra note 48, at *7, 11.
53. Id. at *12, n. 10.
54. Adrienne L. Krikorian & Jeffrey A. Tidus, The Benefits of Active Party Participation in
Mediation, MEDIATE.COM (Feb. 2002), http://www.mediate.com/articles/krikorian1.cfm.
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parties accountable to the mediation program’s requirement, breaches the
very core principles of mediation. First, it jeopardizes the candor that
confidential mediations are supposed to promote. If a party believes the
mediator will report what is said or done during the mediation, the party will
be less likely to be candid about emotions, needs, and possible compromises.
Second, the reporting requirement and judicial compliance turns the
mediator into a non-neutral party. The more determinations the mediator
must make, the more the mediator looks and acts like a judge and the more
mediation becomes an adjudicatory process. Especially when the parties
know the mediator’s word will be used to penalize them later, the parties
will not be forthcoming about potential options for resolution.
Unfortunately, a decision that intends to further the goals of the foreclosure
mediation program—to ensure party participation in the process—actually
degrades mediation’s core values and jeopardizes the very outcomes it seeks
to achieve.
B. Challenges in Implementing Mediation in the Foreclosure Context:
Confidentiality and Accountability in Mediator Reports
As the Nevada cases demonstrate, a primary challenge in designing
foreclosure mediation programs is ensuring that both parties participate in
good faith in a voluntary, confidential process with a trained neutral.55 There
is an “inherent dissonance” between holding parties accountable for good
faith participation and preserving confidentiality, as Professor Kristen
Blankley recognized prior to the inception of foreclosure mediation
programs.56 A mediation program that best incentivizes parties to work out
solutions will find balanced ways to achieve these seemingly conflicting
goals. 57 This article provides some guidance regarding program design
elements that can provide such balance.

55. See John Lande, Using Dispute System Design Methods to Promote Good-Faith
Participation in Court-Connected Mediation Programs, 50 UCLA L. REV. 69, 78 (2002) (noting that
without a “good faith” standard of some sort, participants may just “go through the motions” during
the mediation or may try to take advantage of lesser-situated opponents) [hereinafter Lande]; see
generally, Focus on Confidentiality in Mediation, 5 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 2 (1998), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/dispute_resolution_magazine_home/dispute_magazine_wi
n98.html [hereinafter Focus].
56. Kristen Blankley, Confidentiality or Control: Which will Prevail as Confidentiality and
“Good Faith” Negotiation Statutes Collide in Court-Annexed Mediations?, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION (Nov. 30, 2004), http://www.abanet.org/dispute/essay/confidentialitycontrol.pdf.
57. Alon Cohen, Walk the Talk, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (2010),
http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2010/11/pdf/walk_the_talk.pdf
[hereinafter Walk the Talk].
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Mediation advocates, far before foreclosure mediation developed, have
grappled with how to hold parties publicly accountable in a process that is
otherwise private. 58 Attorney, arbitrator, and mediator Larry R. Rute
thoroughly reviewed state cases and ethics opinions regarding
confidentiality and good faith requirements, aptly highlighting the problems
with either the court or the mediator defining and reporting on bad faith
participation. 59 He concluded that improved “skill by the mediator and trust
by the parties” might help to resolve conflicts. 60 Jeffrey W. Stempel
similarly asserts that courts and mediators must rely on the assumption that
parties want to mediate in good faith.61 Yet, Susan Schultz concludes that a
requirement to determine bad faith behavior in mediation is nothing but “bad
news with alarming consequences.”62 While both mediator skill and party
trust are important aspects of mediation, they do not guarantee a mediation
session will balance confidentiality with the interest in good faith
participation.
Foreclosure mediation programs cannot rely solely on voluntary
compliance to ensure fair processes.63 However, particular dynamics with
the larger foreclosure crisis 64 and borrower/servicer relationships 65 lead
courts, borrower advocates, and even mediation advocates to call for
program accountability measures66 that sometimes violate one or more core

58. See, e.g., Focus, supra note 55.
59. See generally Larry R. Rute, The Evolution of Commercial Mediation in the Midwest: Best
Practices, Confidentiality and Good Faith, 79-JAN J. KAN. B.A. 24 (2010).
60. Id. at 29.
61. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Feeding the Right Wolf: A Niebuhrian Perspective on the
Opportunities and Limits of Mindful Core Concerns Dispute Resolution, 10 NEV. L.J. 472 (2010).
62. Susan Schultz, Bad Faith Mediation; Bad News for Mediators, TEX. MEDIATOR (Winter
2009).
63. See generally Geoffrey Walsh, State and Local Foreclosure Mediation Programs: Can
They
Save
Homes?,
NATIONAL
CONSUMER
LAW
CENTER
(Sept.
2009),
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_mortgage/mediation/report-state-mediationprograms.pdf [hereinafter Walsh].
64. See, e.g., Julie Haviv, U.S. Home Foreclosure Mediation in Jeopardy, REUTERS (Sept. 23,
2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN2340194220090923.
65. Faces
of
the
Home
Foreclosure
Crisis,
WALL
S T.
J.,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704610904576031632838153532.html
(last
updated Dec. 29, 2010).
66. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, A Mortgage Nightmare’s Happy Ending, N.Y. TIMES,
(Dec.
25,
2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/26/business/26mod.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&ref=foreclosures
(citing Kurt Eggert, a professor at Chapman University School of Law); Walsh, supra note 63, at V,
VII.

213

Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2014

11

Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 3

mediation values, if not mediation laws outright. Thus, greater attention to
foreclosure mediation’s goals and subsequent program design, especially per
the role of the mediator, is needed.
Though analysis of the foreclosure crisis, 67 and articles about
foreclosure mediation, 68 are prolific, few scholars have explored how
foreclosure mediation’s goals interact with mediation’s core principles,
especially in light of the inherent dissonance between party behavioral
accountability and confidentiality.69 Many programs cite more than one
goal.70 Some seek to help borrowers and keep them in their homes.71 Others
want to provide a forum for servicers and borrowers to meet face-to-face and
discuss options, regardless of outcomes.72 Still others aim to ease the burden
on overloaded court dockets by having other professionals—housing
67. See, e.g., Times Topics: Foreclosures (2012 Robosigning and Mortgage Servicing
Settlement),
N.Y.
TIMES,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/f/foreclosures/index.html?scp=1spot&sq=foreclosure&st=cse (last visited June 4, 2014).
68. See, e.g., Grace B. Pazdan, How Foreclosure Mediation Legislation Can Keep Vermonters
in their Homes (and Money in the Pockets of Mortgage Holders), 36-SPG VT. B.J. 24 (Spring 2010)
(summarizing the Vermont foreclosure mediation program and advocating that foreclosure
mediation financially helps homeowners and lenders and criticizing the legislature’s decision to cut
lender penalties for non-compliance with the mediation program); Stephen F.J. Ornstein, Matthew S.
Yoon, & John P. Holahan, Florida Foreclosure Mediation Program, 64 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP.
86 (Spring 2010) (outlining procedures for foreclosure mediation program); Madhawa Palihapitiya
& Kaila Eisenkraft, A Study for the Design and Administration of the a Successful Foreclosure
Mediation Program in Massachusetts, MASS. OFFICE PUB. COLLAB. (Feb. 2013),
http://cdn.umb.edu/images/mopc/Foreclosure_mediation_program_study_FINAL.pdf.
69. See, e.g., Shana H. Khader, Mediating Mediations: Protecting the Homeowner’s Right to
Self-Determination in Foreclosure Mediation Programs, 44 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 109 (2010)
(clarifying the difference between official mediation and judicial settlement conferences in the
foreclosure context, examining the power dynamic present in most foreclosure mediations, and
identifying how foreclosure mediation programs can protect the homeowner’s right to selfdetermination through legal consultation and document exchange safeguards).
70. See, e.g., Supreme Court of Nevada, About the Program, STATE OF NEVADA,
http://foreclosure.nevadajudiciary.us/index.php/about-program (last visited June 4, 2014) (stating
Nevada’s goals are “to help keep families in their homes . . . and to provide] an opportunity for
homeowners and lenders to discuss alternatives to foreclosure.”).
71. See, e.g., Press Release from Anne Milgram, N.J. Att’y Gen., Statewide Mortgage
Foreclosure
Mediation
Program
Launched
(Jan.
9,
2009),
http://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases09/pr20090109a.html (last visited June 4, 2014). This goal is an
interesting one for the mediation community to address, since mediation processes traditionally do
not assist only one party or aim for a particular outcome. While this “tension” is prevalent in the
foreclosure context and worth exploring, the scope of this paper does not cover this question.
72. See, e.g., State of Connecticut Judicial Branch, Attorney Frequently Asked Questions,
FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAM, http://www.jud.state.ct.us/foreclosure/attorney_qs.htm (last
visited June 4, 2014); S.C. of Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC09-54, 2 (Dec. 28, 2009), Final Report
and Recommendations on Residential Mortgage Foreclosure Cases, S.C. of Florida Admin. Order
No.
AOSC09-54,
2
(Dec.
28,
2009),
available
at
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/clerk/adminorders/2009/AOSC09-54.pdf.

214

https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol14/iss2/3

12

Kulp: A Tightrope Over Both Your Houses: Ensuring Party Participation a

[Vol. 14: 203, 2014]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

counselors, attorneys, and mediators—assist the court. 73 Some policy
makers cite the “deleterious effects” continued foreclosures will have on the
state economy because they inspire so many state programs.74 And some
borrower advocates involved in program creation explicitly say the
mediations are meant to hold servicers accountable for “bad” practices.75
Below, I contrast these foreclosure mediation76 goals and accountability
measures—some of which are new to the mediation world—with the
priorities and rules under which court-connected mediation historically
operates.
III. COURT-CONNECTED FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAM
MEASURES OF ACCOUNTABILITY
A. Party Participants and Foreclosure Mediation Goals
Foreclosure mediation program structures vary greatly from state to
state and within each city.77 Generally, a foreclosure mediation program
consists of a program manager that schedules and organizes the mediation
session, neutrals that facilitate discussion,78 and mediation participants. In

73. See Greg Allen, Mediation Courts May Ease Foreclosure Backlog, NATIONAL PUBLIC
RADIO
(Apr.
6,
2009),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=102795312&ft=1&f=102795312.
74. S.B.
1137
§
1(d),
2007-2008
Leg.
(Ca.
2008),
available
at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/sen/sb_1101-1150/sb_1137_bill_20100924_chaptered.pdf.
75. See, e.g., Wendy Innes & Andrew White, CT Foreclosure Filings Up, Many Stuck in
Mediation, HARTFORD GUARDIAN (May 29, 2010), http://www.thehartfordguardian.com/?p=4808.
Mediation as punishment denigrates the mediation process and threatens core assumptions like
impartiality and self-determination. See MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 16, at 3,4.
76. To illustrate the use of the principles of “authority,” “accountability,” “participation,” and
“good faith” in the mortgage foreclosure context, I cite state programs that use the term “mediation”
or that the federal government has included under the umbrella of “foreclosure mediation,” though to
traditional court-connected mediation personnel, the program may not conform to a traditional
mediation format. See, e.g., U.S. Department of House and Urban Development & Department of
Justice, Emerging Strategies for Effective Foreclosure Mediation Programs 7 (Nov. 2010).
77. For a description of all programs in existence as of July 19, 2011, see Models, supra note
26.
78. The people that serve as mediators vary among programs. Some have an extensive list of
paid mediators from which to draw. Others operate solely with volunteers. Some programs require
mediators to have extensive mediation experience before practicing in the foreclosure context. Other
programs require no special training for mediators. Some programs specifically cite mediator ethical
guidelines to be followed during the process. Others require mediators to violate the very
professional guidelines to which the mediators must adhere.
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all programs, participants include the borrower and a representative for the
servicer. The representative may be an attorney for the servicer, an
employee of the servicer’s mediation or loss mitigation department, a
servicer employee with greater responsibilities, or some combination of the
three. Other participants may be housing counselors and attorneys to assist
borrowers in preparing for, and participating in, the process.79
These participants have a variety of goals, both stated and unstated, that
drive their desire to uphold or reject certain accountability measures.
Borrower advocates want mediation programs to create protective measures
barring sophisticated parties from using the confidential process to abuse
less sophisticated litigants.80 Banks want to hold borrowers accountable for
the contracts they signed.81 Investors want to hold banks accountable for
returning the most possible on their mortgage-backed securities. 82
Borrowers want to hold banks accountable for good communication
practices, including communications about their loans and potential
modification options.83 Borrower advocates want to hold banks accountable
for proving ownership of the mortgage debt84 and providing transparent loan
modification processes, specifically, HAMP.85 And courts or government
agencies in twenty-six states (at time of this writing), attempting to
ameliorate the effects of the foreclosure crisis, believe that foreclosure
mediation programs can heed these demands.86

79. See Resolution Systems Institute, Foreclosure Mediation Funding Executive Summary ,
RESOLUTION
SYSTEMS
INSTITUTE
(Jan.
26,
2011),
http://courtadr.org/files/ForeclosureMediationFundingExecSummary.pdf (highlighting that almost
half of programs require borrowers meet with a housing counselor before mediation and few
programs provide an attorney to borrowers).
80. Maureen A. Weston, Checks on Participant Conduct in Compulsory ADR: Reconciling the
Tension in the Need for Good-Faith Participation, Autonomy, and Confidentiality, 76 IND. L.J. 591,
597–603 (2001); Kimberlee K. Kovach, Good Faith in Mediation—Requested, Recommended, or
Required? A New Ethic, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 575, 604 (1997) [hereinafter Kovach].
81. Yesner & Boss, Homeowners Turn to Mediators for Relief, P.L BLOG (June 4, 2010),
http://www.yesnerboss.com/2010/06/homeowners-turn-to-mediation-for-relief.html.
82. Al Yoon & Jeff Mason, Investors, White House Press Banks over Mortgages, REUTERS
(Oct. 19, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE69I54T20101019.
83. Jacob Adelman, Homeowners Say Loan Modifications, Balky Banks, Led Them to
Foreclosure,
ASSOCIATED.
PRESS
(Nov.
7,
2010),
http://www.cleveland.com/nation/index.ssf/2010/11/homeowners_say_loan_modificati.html.
84. Jason Hidalgo, Real Estate: Foreclosure Fraud Law Takes Effect on Saturday, RENO
GAZETTE J. (Sept. 30, 2011), http://dcmetro-homemarket.com/bankownedhouses/354/real-estateforeclosure-fraud-law-takes-effect-on-saturday-reno-gazette/.
85. AMI SHAH & KATIE GOTTSCHALL-DONOHUE, SERVICER ACCOUNTABILITY INITIATIVE
FINAL REPORT: DECEMBER 2009 – SEPTEMBER 2010, HOUSING ACTION ILL. 1 (2010), available at
http://www.housingactionil.org/downloads/SAI_FINAL_REPORT.pdf [hereinafter SHAH].
86. See generally Models, supra note 26.
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A recent federal government report highlights “strategies that promote
successful outcomes” in foreclosure mediation programs. The report
promotes including “accountability measures” in foreclosure mediation
program rules.87 The report cites three programs—Maine, Rhode Island, and
Vermont—that provide means to hold parties accountable to participating in
the mediation process to some degree. Other programs not mentioned in the
report also have means for holding parties accountable.88 The types of
actions holding parties accountable lie on a continuum, from most objective
(Element 1) to most subjective (Element 3).
Element 1a Accountability: Attendance
Most foreclosure mediation programs have some requirement that both
servicer counsel and borrower attend the mediation, whether or not they
speak during the session. Attendance may mean physical presence in a
mediation room, or in some cases, one or both sides may attend
telephonically or through video conference.89
In Florida’s First, Eleventh, and Nineteenth Circuits, the mediator is
responsible for reporting the attendance of both the borrower and the
servicer’s representative (an attorney). The administrative orders allow the
court to impose sanctions if the servicer does not appear for the mediation.
Options for sanctions are a fine or dismissal of the case.90 The Maine

87. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV. & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EMERGING STRATEGIES FOR
EFFECTIVE
FORECLOSURE
MEDIATION
PROGRAMS
7
(2010),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/atj/effective-mediation-prog-strategies.pdf.
88. Administrative Order Establishing Foreclosure Mediation Pilot Project, Administrative
Order No. 2009-00001, No. D-0101-CV-77-52749, N.M. First Jud. Dist. Ct. (2009), available at
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_mortgage/foreclosure_med_prog_by_state/nm_admin_
order.pdf (sanctions in New Mexico); S.B. 651, 26th Leg. § 667-L(b) (Haw. 2011), available at
http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session2011/Bills/SB651_CD1_.PDF (sanctions in Hawaii include
fines and a stay of foreclosure); H.B. 1362, 62nd Leg., Reg. Sess., Sec. 7 (11) (Wash. 2011),
available at http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2011-12/PDF/Bills/House%20Bills/1362S2.pdf (Washington State’s foreclosure mediation program allows borrowers to use a mediator’s
certificate of non-compliance by the servicer as a defense to the foreclosure).
89. See, e.g., S.B. 651, 26th Leg. § 667-L(b) (Haw. 2011), available at
http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session2011/Bills/SB651_CD1_.PDF (describing how Hawaii allows
a servicer representative to attend telephonically after receiving permission from the mediator and
the borrower).
90. See, e.g., Amended Administrative Order Governing Mandatory Circuit Court Mediation
for Owner-Occupied Residential Mortgage Foreclosures, 2009-02-01, 4 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2009),
available
at
http://ninja9.org/adminorders/orders/2009-02-01%20%20amended%20residential%20foreclosure%20to%20mediation%20orange%20county.pdf.
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foreclosure mediation statute allows the court more flexibility. The judge
may determine “appropriate sanctions” for a party’s non-attendance.91 At
least one Vermont court has sanctioned a servicer for not appearing for
mediation by ordering the servicer to participate and tolling all fees incurred
on the mortgage debt after the order for mediation was issued.92
Element 1b Accountability: Attendance with Authority93
Nevada requires a somewhat higher level of accountability. There, a
party not only must attend, but also must have the authority to modify the
loan. The servicer, rather than the mediator, files a certificate of compliance
with mediation, stating that the servicer attended and participated in good
faith. The mediator must report if the servicer does not have a representative
authorized to modify the loan available during the mediation.94
Element 2 Accountability: Document Exchange
Managing document exchange is at the heart of making the foreclosure
mediation process efficient and effective, as most discussions between a
borrower and servicer eventually explore the option of a loan modification.
Without proper documents from the borrower, the servicer cannot evaluate a
borrower for a loan modification.95 Some courts require the servicer to
submit documents proving the servicer has the right to foreclose on the
mortgage debt or other documents that may assist the mediation process.96
Most foreclosure mediation programs require one or both parties to send
documents relevant to a loan modification to the other prior to the mediation
session. Some will not conduct mediation before the servicer reviews loan
modification documents and issues a written decision.
91. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6321-A (2009).
92. Citibank v. Mumley, No. S1087-09 CnC, 2011 WL 8472914 (Vt. Super. Ct. Sept. 1, 2011).
93. Because attendance with authority is a different requirement than simply having a
representative attend mediation, I separate these types of attendance. See, e.g., James R. Madison,
Everything You Need to Know About Authority to Settle a Mediation, 63 DISP. RESOL. J. 20 (2008).
94. NEV.
SUP.
C T.
FORECLOSURE
MEDIATION
R.
(2009),
available
at
http://www.nevadajudiciary.us/images/foreclosure/adkt435_amendedrules.pdf.
95. Thomas B. Scheffey, Young Solo Helps Family Avoid Foreclosure Through Mediation,
CONN. L. TRIB., Apr. 6, 2011, http://www.cjdonlinesq.com/connecticut-foreclosure-mediationattorney.html.
96. See, e.g., McLean v. JP Morgan Chase Bank Nat’l Ass’n., 79 So. 3d 170 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2012) (reversing the decision to grant summary judgment to Chase and ordering Chase to
submit proper documentation of its ability to foreclose); Diane C. Lade, Foreclosure Crisis: Lenders
Holding Back Critical Information at Mediations, SUN SENTINEL, Mar. 3, 2011, http://articles.sunsentinel.com/2011-03-03/business/fl-mediation-documents-20110302_1_mediations-margerygolant-foreclosure-defense-attorneys.
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For example, both Providence, Rhode Island’s and Vermont’s 97
programs require servicers to provide written documentation for the reasons
a loan modification was denied. In Vermont, the borrower must make a
good faith effort to provide any information required by the Home
Affordable Modification Program (HAMP)98 to the mediator at least 20 days
prior to mediation.99 Similarly, the servicer must share with the borrower
and the mediator what modification options the servicer is considering and
the reasons for certain determinations. 100 If the servicer states that an
investor agreement, called a pooling and servicing agreement, prohibits
modification, the servicer must produce a copy of the agreement. 101
Importantly, all exchanged documents shall be confidential and shall not be
included in the mediator’s report.102 There is no mechanism for the mediator
to report good faith participation.
In Providence, the Conciliation Coordinator103 must file a Certificate of
Compliance after determining whether both parties participated in the
Conciliation Conference and cooperated in the process.104 The Certificate
includes an explanation of how both parties made a “good faith effort” to
reach an agreement.105 To describe this effort, the Conciliation Coordinator
collects information about the efforts of both parties from the parties
themselves.106

97. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4632 (2009).
98. Under HAMP, lenders are required to solicit eligible borrowers who are more than thirtyone days past due on their mortgage for a loan modification. SHAH, supra note 85. Eligible
borrowers are homeowners who took out their primary residence’s current mortgage on or before
January 1, 2009, who are experiencing financial hardship, who owe less than $729, 750 on their
current mortgage, and who have current mortgage payments at least 32% of gross income. See
Home
Affordable
Modification
Program,
MAKING
HOME
AFFORDABLE,
http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/programs/lower-payments/Pages/hamp.aspx (last updated
May 28, 2013) (click on “Eligibility” bar).
99. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 4633(b) (2009).
100. Id. at § 4633(a)(1).
101. Id. at § 4633(a)(3).
102. Id.
103. The third party in Providence’s Conciliation Conferences is a HUD counselor not bound
by professional mediation rules.
CITY OF PROVIDENCE, FORECLOSURE CONCILIATION
REQUIREMENT, DUTIES OF PARTICIPANTS, APPLYING THE ORDINANCE, MODEL CERTIFICATIONS 4
(2009), available at http://cityof.providenceri.com/efile/230.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 5.
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Element 3 Accountability: Good Faith Participation
In Maine’s program, the court has the authority to assess costs and fees
to either party failing to make a good faith effort in mediation sessions.107
The requirement for parties to participate in good faith comes from Maine’s
Court Alternative Dispute Resolution Service Rule: “Each party and their
attorney . . . shall make a good faith effort to mediate all disputed issues.”108
The party, through the court (or through a Non-Compliance Report), may
motion for sanctions if anyone violates any part of the Rule, including the
“good faith effort” requirement. 109 In some types of cases, e.g.,
landlord/tenant, the court must hold a hearing to determine if the parties
mediated in good faith before hearing the merits of the case, regardless of
whether the parties allege bad faith.110 In foreclosure cases, as part of the
mediation report, the mediator “may notify the court if, in the mediator’s
opinion, either party failed to negotiate in good faith.”111 Maine has not
adopted the Uniform Mediation Act, which would bar the mediator from
making such reports.112
Interestingly, Washington has adopted the Uniform Mediation Act and
its foreclosure mediation law still requires the mediator to report to the
Department of Commerce whether the parties participated in good faith.113
This report features a series of boxes the mediator can check to indicate what
action of the borrower or servicer constituted a failure to mediate in good
faith. Actions include lack of timely or accurate provision of documents,
failure to timely appear, representation without authority to make a binding
decision, and failure to pay a fee. Mediators may report all of these
objective actions under the UMA. The Washington mediator’s report also
allows the mediator to include an attachment that describes “additional
details of the mediation session.” 114 This descriptive paragraph would

107. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6321-A(12) (2009).
108. ME. R. CIV. P. 92(b)(5)(E).
109. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6321-A(12) (2009).
110. Id. at § 6004-A (2007).
111. Id. at § 6321-A(13) (2009).
112. However, the Reporter’s Notes states that the privilege rule was based on the UMA. ME.
R. EVID. 514 advisory committee note (2009).
113. H.B. 1362, 62nd Leg., Reg. Sess. Sec. 7(9)(d) (Wash. 2011), available at
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2011-12/Pdf/Bills/Session%20Laws/House/1362S2.SL.pdf.
114. State of Washington Department of Commerce, Foreclosure Mediation Report, available
at http://qa.commerce.wa.gov/Documents/Foreclosure%20Cert%20of%20Mediation%20form.xls)
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almost inevitably include subjective determinations from the mediator that
would violate the state’s UMA law.115
IV. ACCOUNTABILITY MEASURES AND CORE MEDIATION PRINCIPLES
A. Balancing Values
Throughout these varied practices, the same thread of questions
remains: for what, and to whom, does the program want the participants to
be accountable? Showing up? Prompt communication before and during
the mediation? Fair participation in the process? Polite treatment of the
other side? Exploring every possible option?
It seems like courts’ and legislatures’ vigor around accountability stems
mainly from frustration, and sometimes anger, with the radical increase in
foreclosures and the subsequent debacles related to the increase.116 Servicers
had to rapidly ramp up foreclosure processes, increasing stress on the nearcollapsed banks’ recently stabilized resources.117 People facing foreclosure
often feel confused or deceived, because of complicated bank loans or
subprime mortgage scams.118 Some borrower advocates call for “holding
servicers’ feet to the fire” and the “imposition of significant obligations” on
the servicers to correct the perceived deception.119 Some even call for the
states to use their police power to enforce these obligations in mediations.120

115. WASH.
REV.
CODE
§
7.07.060
(2005),
available
at
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=7.07.060.
116. See, e.g., U.S. Home Foreclosure Mediation in Jeopardy, REUTERS, Sept. 23, 2009,
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN2340194220090923.
117. See Nelson D. Schwartz, Voices of Foreclosure Speak Daily About Desperation and
Misery,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Nov.
16,
2010,
B1,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/16/business/economy/16foreclose.html?_r=1&ref=mortgages.
118. Faces of the Home-Foreclosure Crisis, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704610904576031632838153532.html.
119. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, A Mortgage Nightmare’s Happy Ending, N.Y. Times, Dec.
26,
2010,
at
BU1,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/26/business/26mod.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&ref=foreclosures
(citing Kurt Eggert, a professor at Chapman University School of Law); Walsh, supra note 63, at V).
120. See, e.g., Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the States should enact
a temporary moratorium on residential mortgage foreclosures, H.R. Res. 181, 111th Cong. (1st Sess.
2009), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c111:H.RES.181:# (recommending states
use their police power to stop foreclosures, since the foreclosure crisis creates a state of emergency
in some areas).
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Emotional reactions to perceived injustice are often the catalyst for
policy change. But this anger should not lead to knee-jerk program design—
policy in action—that foregoes the basic principles of mediation, even if
those principles are sometimes held in tension. In some cases, the desire for
methods to mitigate foreclosure has turned mediation into a non-neutral
space. Mediators sometimes make judgments about the parties, which not
only threatens the confidentiality of the mediation, but also changes the
mediator’s role from a third party neutral to an adjudicator. Some programs
have even articulated “continuing mediation” as one of the sanctions for bad
faith participation in mediations. 121 Contrary to what some housing
advocates believe, requiring the mediator to report about party behavior may
discourage, rather than encourage, parties from fully disclosing settlement
options.122
Still, advocates for those who enter the court system without a
sophisticated understanding of the process make good points about
mediation needing protective measures to bar sophisticated parties from
using an unregulated process to abuse pro se litigants.123 Others rightly point
out that borrowers can use mediation to draw out the foreclosure process.124
Programs cannot rely solely on voluntary compliance with their
accountability measures to result in fair processes.125
How can foreclosure mediation programs ensure equal bargaining and
worthwhile party participation without negatively altering the role of the
mediator and thus, undermining the benefits of mediation? A program must
respond to these needs in a way that encourage balanced, self-determined
solutions.126 A description of tensions programs face and suggestions of
balanced solutions are below.

121. See Mortgage Foreclosure Mediation R. (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2010) (draft) (on file with author).
122. The National Consumer Law Center advocates that, to “increase homeowner participation”
in the mediation process, courts should: “3. Stay all foreclosure proceedings until a mediator or court
determines that the servicer has complied in good faith with all participation obligations; 4. Provide
for direct court supervision over the enforcement of servicer obligations to mediate, including the
imposition of sanctions when necessary. Sanctions must include dismissal of judicial foreclosure
actions and orders barring non-judicial proceedings.” Walsh, supra note 63, at vii.
123. Weston, supra note 80, at 597–603; Kovach, supra note 80, at 604.
124. Kenneth R. Gosselin, Distressed Homeowners in Mediation Get Reprieve from
Foreclosure Litigation, HARTFORD COURANT, June 9, 2011, http://articles.courant.com/2011-0609/business/hc-foreclosure-bill-0610-20110609_1_mediation-program-foreclosure-proceedingsbank-lobbyists.
125. Walsh, supra note 63, at v.
126. Walk the Talk, supra note 57.
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Element 1 Accountability: Attendance
Having both parties attend mediation is an obvious prerequisite to
working out an agreement. Attendance can mean a variety of things. Some
programs require servicer executives to be present for the mediation, while
others allow all servicer representatives, including counsel, to participate
telephonically.127 Some programs hold an initial conference with a mediator
or judge in which only the borrower must be present. 128 In these
conferences, a judge or mediator reviews a borrower’s case to determine
whether it is appropriate to send to mediation. Only then can a borrower
schedule a meeting with the servicer.
In most foreclosure mediation programs, if parties do not attend, the
case can get dismissed or remanded for the judge to make a determination,
or the judge can sanction the party who did not attend.129 Although the
Federal Housing Finance Agency, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal
Housing Authority already require servicers to pursue loss mitigation with
borrowers, a mediator can observe people participating in a process in
furtherance of loss mitigation and report on that attendance, which the UMA
permits.130 Then, the court or other program administrator can hold people
accountable for their attendance.
Some problems with attendance requirements occur when parties have
unexpected life events that threaten their attendance. Cars break down,
snowstorms prevent safe travel, babysitters cancel, other clients require
immediate attention. Both parties face these events: borrowers and
servicers. Dismissing a case for one missed mediation seems like a
punishment too great for the crime. Yet, every missed mediation increases

127. Compare e.g., Administrative Order No. 10-18: Residential Mortgage Foreclosure
Mandatory
Mediation
Program
(Ill.
Cir.
Ct.
2010),
available
at
http://www.willcountycourts.com/images/stories/WillCounty/mediationadminorder.pdf, with U.S.
BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY, LOSS MITIGATION PROGRAM AND PROCEDURES
VIII(B)
(2011),
available
at
http://www.njb.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/downloads/2011_07_29_Loss_Mitigation_Program_a
nd_Procedures_7-28-11.pdf.
128. See, e.g., MCLEAN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE
MANDATORY
MEDIATION
PROGRAM
RULES
3(I),
available
at
http://www.mcleancountyil.gov/documentcenter/view/1691.
129. Brett Goodman, Can a Court Impose Sanctions for Failing to Appear at Court-Ordered
June
2011,
Mediation?,
MEDIATE.COM,
http://www.mediate.com//articles/GoodmanBbl20110605.cfm.
130. UMA § 7(b).
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administration costs and delays the negotiation and settlement of a
foreclosure case, sometimes by months.
Not only do the parties need to attend the mediation, but the right parties
need to attend a mediation for any agreement to result. If a party does not
have the authority to settle, the mediation is nothing more than a discussion
about what could be.131 In the foreclosure mediation context, counsel or loss
mitigation personnel, who may not know much about the specific
foreclosure case, represent servicers. Attorneys often have “settlement
authority” from their clients up to a certain dollar amount. In the foreclosure
context, this could mean that the servicer has only authorized the servicer’s
attorney to make one or two alternative offers to foreclosure. This frustrates
mediation processes that seek to explore “all [available] options.”132 It also
frustrates a borrower who educated herself about potential resolution options
and planned for how she could meet each. It even frustrates the servicer’s
attorney, who may not know any more about the situation than the two pages
of authorization paperwork her client gave her. Some programs require that
the parties with full settlement authority attend to avoid having mediation
participants with little knowledge of their client or what the client can do.133
Having servicers present seems like it would alleviate much anxiety in
the process. Yet, requiring a servicer with full settlement authority to attend
would be challenging. Servicers with greater authority are often hundreds, if
not thousands, of miles from the bank that made the loan. Even the servicer
employees who do attend by phone are often only able to speak about a
limited scope of options. They have to refer a mediation session to another
division to discuss a different option. 134 With foreclosure mediation
programs springing up around the country, this would mean that servicers
would have to employ thousands more representatives to travel to each
mediation. Programs already have trouble getting enough mediators and
legal aid attorneys. The administrative nightmare that could ensue would
extend the foreclosure process far beyond the already-long 438 day
average.135
131.
132.
133.

Madison, supra note 93.
Walsh, supra note 63, at 19.
See, e.g., C.P. CUYOGA COUNTY, FORECLOSURE MEDIATION CASE MANAGEMENT
DIRECTIVE
III(b)(i)
(2008),
available
at
http://cp.cuyahogacounty.us/internet/CourtDocs/Fore_Med_CMD.pdf.
134. For instance, one department may deal with HAMP and one may manage in-house
modifications.
135. This number represents the number of days between a homeowner defaulting on a loan and
a homeowner being evicted from the home. Lengthening Limbo, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2010,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/imagepages/2010/06/01/business/01nopayGrfx.html?ref=business.
This
timeline is shorter or longer depending on the state, the circuit, and the number of foreclosures in the
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Ensuring the appearance of responsible parties is difficult because of
mortgage-backed securities.136 During the real estate boom of the mid2000s, banks sold mortgages to pooling agents (government and private).
Then, the agent bundled the mortgages into securitized interests. Investors
purchased the bundles and received an agent-backed security guaranteeing
the investor a share of all principal and interest payments made in return.
So, if a home in one of these mortgage-backed security pools goes into
foreclosure, the investors have some authority to make demands for
payment. Requiring all investors in a mortgage to come to the mediation
table would be like requiring all stockholders of a large company to vote at
every stockholder meeting.
Some mediation advocates claim that letting a responsible party send a
lawyer instead of appearing in person compromises the ability to explore all
options in mediation. However, it may be better to settle for a representative
with limited authority with access to people with greater authority than to
make demands for persons with authority who may not add much to the
mediation session.
Element 2 Accountability: Documentation Exchange
Requiring both parties to have documents ready for the mediation is a
worthwhile prerequisite. Document review and exchange constitutes much
of the mediation time before servicers can consider a loan modification.
Indeed, borrowers not having the correct or updated documentation or
servicers not processing submitted applications in time cause mediations to
roll over into a second session or beyond.137 However, there are two major
reasons against program administrators making bad faith judgments if

area. See, e.g., New Hampshire, Foreclosure Timeline, Help for New Hampshire Homeowners,
http://www.homehelpnh.org/understanding-your-situation/the-foreclosure-process/ (last visited June
2, 2014), compare with Cleveland, The Foreclosure Timeline, The Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland, Dec. 12, 2009, http://www.clevelandfed.org/Forefront/2009/12/ff_20091216_08.cfm.
For an extensive discussion on timelines and how they impact foreclosures, see Amy Crews Cutts &
William A. Merrill, Interventions in Mortgage Default: Policies and Practices to Prevent Home
Loss and Lower Costs, Freddie Mac Working Paper #08-01(2008), available at
http://www.freddiemac.com/news/pdf/interventions_in_mortgage_default.pdf.
Note that this
resource does not account for how mediations lengthen or shorten foreclosure timelines.
136. Mortgage-Backed Securities, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/mortgagesecurities.htm (last visited June. 2, 2014).
137. Walk the Talk, supra note 57, at 15.
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parties fail to submit a certain list of documents prior to the mediation or
bring them to the mediation.138
First, borrowers and servicers frequently lose or misplace documents.139
The reasons could be as simple as dealing with a mass of paperwork or as
complicated as not having the educational background to understand what
bank paperwork is important. While losing the paperwork intentionally may
be grounds for sanctions, parties should not always face sanctions. 140
Borrowers already express hesitation at turning over paperwork in a process
they are not sure is confidential.141 Sanctions would discourage the parties
from participating at all if they feared they did not have the right
paperwork.142 Sanctions would also stall parties from working on a main
goal of mediation: improved communication.
Facilitating clear
communication about paperwork is a primary, positive outcome of
foreclosure mediation.
Second, servicers’ attorneys have repeatedly emphasized that they
cannot get their clients to provide a standardized list of documents needed
for loan modifications, even modifications that are federally-managed, like
HAMP.143 Because servicers change their qualification criteria frequently,
and each servicer has its own loan modification programs, a consistent list
would be nearly impossible. Additionally, a borrower’s circumstances may
lead to different document requests; for example, a self-employed person
must submit different documentation than someone with a direct deposit
from an employer. Thus, the program would have to create its own list,
which would be neither complete nor sufficient for what the servicers
actually need. Such endeavors would waste precious mediation time.
Some advocates want to, and some courts do, require servicers to
provide borrowers with written documentation of how the servicers calculate
net present value, what the pooling and servicing agreement says, or what

138. Nevada’s program allows for a finding of bad faith if either party does not provide
necessary documents. See, e.g., Supreme Court of Nevada, Questions, STATE OF NEVADA,
http://foreclosure.nevadajudiciary.us/index.php/questions (last visited June 8, 2014).
139. See, e.g., SHAH, supra note 85, at 11.
140. Alon Cohen, Clearing the Foreclosure Crisis: Foreclosure Mediation Can Reduce
Uncertainty,
Center
for
Am.
Progress,
Oct.
25,
2010,
http://americanprogress.org/issues/housing/news/2010/10/25/8565/clearing-the-foreclosure-crisisforeclosure-mediation-can-reduce-uncertainty/.
141. See Kimberly Miller, Foreclosure Mediation Suffers from Lack of Information,
Preparation, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 4, 2011, http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2011-0104/news/os-foreclosures-mediation-report-20110103_1_alternative-dispute-resolution-rulesforeclosure-mediation-mediation-program.
142. Walk the Talk, supra note 57, at 16.
143. Meeting with Anonymous Lenders’ Attorneys (2010) (on file with author).
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formulation(s) the servicer uses to consider loan modifications.144 These
requirements would certainly make the foreclosure and modification process
more transparent, which is one of the goals of mediation. However, for
some of these documents, like the pooling and servicing agreement, the
servicer must request the investors to authorize those disclosures. Such
authorization would be on a case-by-case basis, thus extending the
foreclosure process even further. In many instances, the borrower would
neither understand what the pooling and servicing agreement is, nor how it
would help her case (and in most instances, having the document would not
help her case).
Further, the mediator should not be in a position to explain, let alone
evaluate, any paperwork. 145 This practice morphs mediation, which
preserves the role of a third party as the neutral, into arbitration, which
involves a third party as an adjudicator.146
The mediator also should not report her opinion about the loan
modification process.147 A mediation is not about deciding right and wrong,
but about parties exploring options for a self-determined resolution.148 Thus,
the mediator can help facilitate explanation (by asking questions), but should
not be advising the borrower or reviewing paperwork for its completeness.
If program managers determine it is more important to explore whether
mortgage procedures were correct than to settle the case at hand, the
program should direct parties to an adjudicative process first.149

144. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6321-A(13) (2009) (requiring the mediator’s
report to include the outcome of the Net Present Value worksheet); Walsh, supra note 63, at Vi; see
also Katie Buitrago, New Bill Could Improve Accuracy and Fairness of Foreclosure Process,
WOODSTOCK INSTITUTE, Dec. 1, 2010, http://www.woodstockinst.org/blog/2010/new-bill-couldimprove-accuracy-and-fairness-foreclosure-process [hereinafter New Bill].
145. Contra Walsh, supra note 63, at 11.
146. Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Mediation: The ‘New Arbitration’ 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.
61 (2012), available at http://www.hnlr.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/61-96.pdf.
147. Contra Walsh, supra note 63, at 11;
An Act To Preserve Home Ownership and Stabilize the Economy by Preventing Unnecessary
Foreclosures, H.P. 994, L.D. 1418, 124th Leg., §§ 3, 13 (Me. 2009) (amending Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.
tit. 14, § 6321-A (2009)).
148. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 16.
149. See infra Part V (discussing how a program can check for homeowner defenses and still
maintain a mediation program’s core values).
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Element 3 Accountability: Good Faith Participation
In 2009, the National Consumer Law Center published a report that,
among other reforms, called for accountability measures to ensure consumer
protection from bad bank behavior in foreclosure mediation programs. The
recommendation was to have the mediator report on bad behavior and
recommend punishment for the bank.150 While this may seem extreme to
long-time mediators, the Nevada case indicates that these roles may become
more and more common for mediators. But, as Blankley, Stempel, and
Lande, among others, have pointed out, a mediator being responsible for
ensuring good faith participation and for upholding core mediation
principles creates inherent dissonance.151 In effect, the requirements create
more than inherent dissonance; they quite simply degrade the fabric of
confidentiality, neutrality, and self-determination that renders mediation a
beneficial alternative to traditional conflict resolution settings.
B. Confidentiality
Some programs have created a “certificate of compliance” for mediators
to report whether the parties operated in good faith throughout the mediation
process.152 If program rules state the value of all parties participating in
good faith, the program will need a mechanism to enforce such provisions.
Values without teeth do not operate as values at all.
Confidentiality is also often prescribed in a local rule,153 state statute,154
or professional standard.155 It is also preserved in the Uniform Mediation
Act (UMA) and thus, applies in states that have adopted the UMA.156 A

150. Walsh, supra note 63..
151. Alexandria Zylstra, The Road from Voluntary Mediation to Mandatory Good Faith
Requirements: A Road Best Left Untraveled, 17 J. AMER. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 69 (2001),
available
at
http://www.aaml.org/sites/default/files/the%20road%20from%20voluntarymediation.pdf.
152. See, e.g., STATE OF OREGON, FORECLOSURE AVOIDANCE MEDIATION PROGRAM
CERTIFICATE
OF
COMPLIANCE
(2012),
available
at
http://www.doj.state.or.us/consumer/pdf/foreclosure_mediation_certificate_of_compliance.pdf.
153. MO. SUP. CT. R. 17.06.
154. 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/8 (2004) (confidentiality); 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/7 (2004)
(prohibiting mediator reports); 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/4(a) (2004) (stating that a mediation
communication is privileged and undiscoverable; a party may refuse to disclose and may prevent
others from disclosing communications).
155. Model Standards, supra note 16; CENTER FOR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT & THE INSTITUTE OF
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR COURT-CONNECTED MEDIATION
PROGRAMS (1992), available at http://courtadr.org/files/NationalStandardsADR.pdf [hereinafter
NATIONAL STANDARDS].
156. UMA § 7.
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mediator’s commitment to confidentiality means that the mediator, with a
few exceptions, 157 cannot report any communications made during the
course of mediation. This includes reporting anything about bad faith/good
faith participation in the mediation, even if the report is to the court.158
Confidentiality of the proceeding guarantees that all parties involved have a
safe place to explore options, without risk of exposing themselves to legal
liability for their statements or questions. In a few states, mediators may
face reprimands or de-certification for breaches of confidentiality, including
breaches for the purpose of reporting bad faith negotiating.159
C. Neutrality
Another reason that tasking mediators with bad faith/good faith analysis
is unethical is because it requires mediators to make subjective
determinations about the mediation and the parties therein.
Like
confidentiality, neutrality is a core ethical value of mediation. 160 It is
necessary to promote confidence and trust, so the mediator may promote
honest dialogue and party self-determination.161 If lawyers and parties think
the mediator may make a subjective determination about their behavior, the
lawyers and parties may not be forthcoming in the mediation, which
jeopardizes the whole process.162

157. UMA § 8.
158. UMA at Reporter’s Notes.
159. Florida Mediator Ethics Advis. Comm., Op. FL-1992-95-GV (1992); Tenn. S.C. Alt. Disp.
Resol.
Comm.,
In re: James R. Finney
(Nov.
2,
2006),
available at
http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/rule_31_mediator_adrc_grievance_decision_11-2-06.pdf.
160. Model Standards, supra note 16, at 5.
161. State v. Williams, 877 A.2d 1258, 1266 (N.J. 2005). It is important to recognize that “[i]f
mediation confidentiality is important, the appearance of mediator impartiality is imperative. A
mediator, although neutral, often takes an active role in promoting candid dialogue . . . To perform
that function, a mediator must be able to instill the trust and confidence of the participants in the
mediation process. That confidence is insured if the participants trust that information conveyed to
the mediator will remain in confidence. Neutrality is the essence of the mediation process. . . .
Thus, courts should be especially wary of mediator testimony because no matter how carefully
presented, [it] will inevitably be characterized so as to favor one side or the other.” (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted).
162. Indeed, servicer attorneys in Nevada have called mediators “biased” because they use
“extreme enforcement of the rules” by finding servicers in bad faith for not wanting to reduce
principal on a loan. Doug McMurdo, Lenders’ Conduct in Foreclosure Program Angers Justices,
LAS VEGAS REV. J., Apr. 5, 2011, available at http://www.lvrj.com/news/lenders-conduct-inforeclosure-program-angers-justices-119291304.html?ref=304.
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Few mediators are trained to make judgments that may have legal
consequences, let alone judgments as vague as what constitutes good faith
participation.163 Not even judges agree on what good faith participation
means, calling it an “intangible and abstract quality with no technical
meaning or statutory definition.”164
Some may think that creating a definition for good faith may be
worthwhile. However, a definition of good faith, other than a description of
a specific action (like not appearing at a mediation), is elusive.165 More
intangible qualities, like fairness, appear in attempted definitions. Defining
good faith would only lead to a mediator having to make more subjective
judgments. This could allow mediator bias to influence judgments, further
eroding the neutrality of mediation. Additionally, mediators may be bound
by other ethical rules (e.g., attorney ethics) that prohibit them from making
such judgments.166
Requiring or permitting disclosures about bad faith conduct would be
particularly inadvisable for states that have adopted the UMA, for the court
rule would be in direct conflict with state law.167 The Nevada Foreclosure
Mediation program administrators considered this when creating their own
mediator guidelines and roundly rejected any requirement of “good faith”
evaluation.168 But, after political pressure to give the program more teeth,
the program administrators not only allowed mediator reports of bad
behavior, but the court also ruled that judges must follow the mediator’s
suggestion of sanctions. 169 Even more inappropriate than making a
subjective determination about what good faith participation means is
making a subjective determination about sanctions for a party.170 This is
directly contrary to the quality that distinguishes a mediator from a judge:
both are impartial, but only a mediator is neutral as to the outcome. By

163. Carol L. Izumi & Homer C. LaRue, Prohibiting “Good Faith” Reports Under the Uniform
Mediation Act: Keeping the Adjudication Camel out of the Mediation Tent, 2003 J. DISP. RESOL. 67,
71 (2003).
164. Doyle v. Gordon, 158 N.Y.S.2d 248, 259 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
165. Some scholars have created lists of behaviors that would fall under a good faith/bad faith
definition. See, e.g., Kovach, supra note 80, at 622–23.
166. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.4 (1983).
167. Resolution on Good Faith Requirements for Mediators and Mediation Advocates in CourtMandated Mediation Programs, A.B.A. SEC. DISP. RESOL. 4 (Aug. 7, 2004), available at
www.abanet.org/dispute/draftres2.doc [hereinafter Resolution on Good Faith]; see e.g., WASH. REV.
CODE
§
7.07.060
(2005),
available
at
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=7.07.060.7.07.060.
168. Walk the Talk, supra note 57, at n.20.
169. Walk the Talk, supra note 57, at 13.
170. Contra Walk the Talk, supra note 57, at 13.
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essentially issuing an order for sanctions, the mediator has become a nonneutral adjudicator.
Requiring mediators to report on good faith/bad faith also jeopardizes
the role of the judiciary.171 If mediators must share their good faith/bad faith
evaluations with the trial court, even the most unbiased trial court will form
a view of the parties before the court hears the merits of the case. Even
worse, the mediator’s judgment is based on a subjective standard. The
mediator has heard no evidence in the case nor knows the history of other
motions the parties may have made. Furthermore, the party to the mediation
who gets reported for bad faith has little recourse for the impact the report
may have. The party may not challenge the report, and it is not subject to
the rules of evidence.172 Ultimately, the mediator’s opinion could, and at
least in Nevada does, decide the outcome of the case—the exact opposite of
a mediator’s role.173
D. Party Self-Determination174
Another, less obvious, consequence of requiring mediators to report on
the good faith participation of the parties is that parties may feel pressure to
settle, even if settlement is not in their best interest. Mediation programs are
supposed to generate multiple options to resolve a case. However, some
servicers are coming to the negotiating table with only a “take it or leave it”
offer, an offer which may represent the full extent of their authority.175 In an
effort to force servicers to negotiate more, some housing advocates want
programs to mandate and document the analysis of all possible alternatives
to foreclosure in each mediation. 176 But, even with the best of court
171. This is specifically what the National Standards hoped to address. See NATIONAL
STANDARDS, supra note 155, at § 12.1 & Commentary.
172. See, e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:23C-7 (2004); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 99 (2001).
173. NATIONAL STANDARDS, supra note 155, at 12.2; Society of Professionals in Dispute
Resolution, MANDATED PARTICIPATION AND SETTLEMENT COERCION: DISPUTE RESOLUTION AS IT
RELATES TO THE COURTS 18 (1991).
174. For an excellent exploration of the power dynamic and self-determination principles in
tension in foreclosure mediations, see Shana H. Khader, Mediating Mediations: Protecting the
Homeowner’s Right to Self-Determination in Foreclosure Mediation Programs, 44 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC.
PROBS.
109,
129
(2010),
available
at
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/jlsp/pdf/Fall%202010/Khader.JLSP.44.1.pdf.
175. Walsh, supra note 63, at 12; see also E-mail from Tina Cooper, Dir. of Cook Cnty.
Foreclosure Mediation Program, to Heather Scheiwe Kulp, Staff Attorney, Resolution Sys. Inst.
(Dec. 10, 2010) (on file with author).
176. Walsh, supra note 63, at 19; see also New Bill, supra note 144.
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intentions, the parties, through exploring options, may understand “good
faith participation” to mean “negotiat[ing] to the death.” As the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York has recognized in
overturning a servicer’s sanction for not conducting a full “risk analysis” in
preparation for mediation, it is not always in the best interest of parties to
keep negotiating, let alone to settle.177 Indeed, forcing negotiations threatens
core values of mediation: party empowerment and self-determination.178
Parties deserve to have a clear, simple behavioral guideline to follow in
mediation because most parties do want to comply with the court’s order to
mediate.179 Therefore, courts should not create policies that people may
misinterpret as coercing parties into settlement.180
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROGRAM DESIGN TO PRESERVE
CONFIDENTIALITY AND ENSURE ACCOUNTABILITY IN
FORECLOSURE MEDIATION
Foreclosure mediation program designers should look to the core values
of mediation—which have existed long before the foreclosure crisis—when
seeking to hold servicers and borrowers accountable and to protect the
confidentiality and neutrality of the mediation process. Quality dispute
resolution system design can ensure accountability and protect the core
values that make mediation a powerful, effective resolution process.181
Element 1 Accountability: Attendance
May Be the Responsibility of the Mediator
Mediators do not violate any ethical rules, laws, or best practices in the
dispute resolution field by indicating whether or not a party attended
mediation. It is an objective measure of party accountability for the process.

177. Jeffrey A. Wurst & Daniel L. McAuliffe, Southern District Establishes Standards for
“Good Faith” Participation in Court-Ordered Mediation, 9 ABF J. 59, 59-60 (July/Aug. 2011).
178. Ulrich Boettger, Efficiency Versus Party Empowerment—Against a Good-Faith
Requirement In Mandatory Mediation, REV. LITIG. 1, 2 (2004).
179. See Good Faith Participation in Mediation: Recent Decisions in New York and California,
BUS. LITIG. REP. (Quinn Emanuel, Los Angeles, C.A.), Jan. 10, 2012, available at
http://www.quinnemanuel.com/media/247355/qe%20january%202012%20newsletter.pdf.
180. Alon Cohen & Andrew Jakabovics, Now We’re Talking, Center for American Progress
(2010)),
available
at
http://www.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/issues/2010/06/pdf/foreclosure_mediation.pdf [hereinafter Now We’re Talking];
Walk the Talk, supra note 57, at 10.
181. John Lande, Using Dispute System Design Methods to Promote Good-Faith Participation
in Court-Connected Mediation Programs, 50 UCLA L. REV. 69, 75–76 (2002).
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Thus, the mediator may fulfill Element 1a Accountability. But, the
challenges indicated above with assuring attendance, and attendance of
someone who has authority to settle, are best addressed with the following
provisions.
1. Make mediation mandatory so people have an expectation interest in
attending, and support outreach programs that inform as many
participants as possible about the program and its potential benefits.182
Most current foreclosure mediation programs are optional, meaning
borrowers have to request mediation. About one percent of borrowers in
foreclosure in these states opt in to mediation.183 Some people are just
giving up their homes. But, this low opt-in number also likely reflects
both the difficulty in getting people to sign up for new programs and the
lack of public education about the mediation process. The low opt in
rate also shows the benefits of automatic programs, where borrowers in
foreclosure are scheduled for mediation when the foreclosure is filed,
that result in over fifty percent participation.184 In comparison to the
mere threats of a mediator’s report, automatic programs seem to be more
effective in ensuring broader attendance.
2. Allow for scheduling flexibility. While administrative costs increase
with every missed mediation, few programs experience “no-shows”
regularly. Allowing parties to reschedule one mediation apiece leaves
room so that unforeseen circumstances will not jeopardize the process.
Administrators must ensure that parties know they must call within a
reasonable time before the mediation to reschedule.
3. Create an official opportunity for parties to work together prior to
mediation. This could occur at a court hearing or at a pre-mediation
conference. Parties may exchange documents, educate one another, and
start negotiating before the mediation. Preparatory activities can make
the actual mediation more effective.
182. Now We’re Talking, supra note 180, at 1-2; Walk the Talk, supra note 57, at 10–11.
183. Alon Cohen, The Latest Mortgage Mediation Lesson: Maryland’s Experience Points the
Way
Forward,
CENTER
FOR
AMERICAN
PROGRESS
(Jan.
19,
2011),
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/housing/news/2011/01/19/8946/the-latest-mortgage_mediation_-lesson.html [hereinafter Latest].
184. Latest, supra note 183; Now We’re Talking, supra note 180; Anthony Klan, States Try to
Force
Mortgage
Workouts,
WALL
S T.
J.,
Dec.
31,
2010,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704543004576051843140821936.html.
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4. Provide means for electronic participation.185 Most servicers have
established call centers where servicer employees with modification
authority sit with the borrower data on a computer screen in front of
them. If programs create environments conducive to this electronic
participation, they can ensure people with greater authority are present.
5. Ensure the location for the mediations can accommodate program
designs that both maintain confidentiality (i.e., are not too close to other
mediators or courtrooms) and allow electronic connectivity to phone and
to online chat services or other forms of communication with their
clients. This may require mediations to occur in courthouses, arbitration
centers, community meeting halls, houses of worship, or government
buildings with wireless internet and multiple phone lines. Along with
confidentiality, stakeholders should consider ADA accessibility and the
appearance of neutrality in choosing the location.
6. Ensure that programs have clear mediator reporting forms that give
information about who was present at the mediation. The fewer openended questions on the reporting form, the lower the possibility that the
mediator will share subjective interpretations of the mediation. 186
185. Some legal questions remain about whether telephonic appearance constitutes appearance.
A 2008 Wisconsin trial court sanctioned an insurance company, whose representative appeared by
phone in a non-foreclosure mediation, for breaching a court order. See Lee v. Geico Indem. Co., 776
N.W.2d 622 (Wis. 2009), available at http://www.wisbar.org/res/capp/2009/2008ap003125.htm.
The state statute required: “Each corporate party or other legal entity which is a party shall appear by
an individual other than the attorney, which individual shall have full authority to negotiate in this
matter . . . .” WIS. STAT. § 802.12 (1993) (emphasis added). In the foreclosure mediation context, no
statutes as yet require a representative other than an attorney to appear. A lender representative
(attorney) is almost always physically present in the mediation and has access to a lender phone bank
to discuss options. Courts could avoid conflicting with other state rulings regarding appearance at
mediation by including in the standard foreclosure mediation court order an allowance for phone
participation.
186. These exceptions are limited:
(1) in an agreement evidenced by a record signed by all parties to the
agreement; (2) available to the public under [insert statutory reference to open
records act] or made during a session of a mediation which is open, or is
required by law to be open, to the public; (3) a threat or statement of a plan to
inflict bodily injury or commit a crime of violence; (4) intentionally used to
plan a crime, attempt to commit or commit a crime, or to conceal an ongoing
crime or ongoing criminal activity; (5) sought or offered to prove or disprove a
claim or complaint of professional misconduct or malpractice filed against a
mediator; (6) except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), sought or offered
to prove or disprove a claim or complaint of professional misconduct or
malpractice filed against a mediation party, nonparty participant, or
representative of a party based on conduct occurring during a mediation; or (7)
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7. Rely on the judge’s determination of standing so that mediators can
avoid making an initial legal inquiry, such as whether the servicer has
authority to foreclose on the home.187 Judges often determine who has
the right to bring the case, and who is responsible for defending the
case; judges are far better suited than mediators to make this
determination.188 Mediators retain the ability to question whether all
parties necessary to settle a case are present.
8. Ensure that a clear rule about what is confidential is in the mediation
agreement and both parties sign it, including the parties with authority to
settle. Make electronic signatures possible if that would assist in
ensuring the authorized person is able to participate. While an
agreement reflecting the rule may not be necessary (if a rule is in place,
parties must follow it regardless of an agreement), the act of signing an
agreement reminds parties of their commitment to attend and, if the
mediation results in a settlement, to do what is required by the
settlement. People are more likely to fulfill an agreement they sign.189

sought or offered to prove or disprove abuse, neglect, abandonment, or
exploitation in a proceeding in which a child or adult protective services agency
is a party . . . (b) There is no privilege under Section 4 if a court, administrative
agency, or arbitrator finds, after a hearing in camera, that the party seeking
discovery or the proponent of the evidence has shown that the evidence is not
otherwise available, that there is a need for the evidence that substantially
outweighs the interest in protecting confidentiality, and that the mediation
communication is sought or offered in: (1) a court proceeding involving a
felony [or misdemeanor]; or (2) except as otherwise provided in subsection (c),
a proceeding to prove a claim to rescind or reform or a defense to avoid liability
on a contract arising out of the mediation. (c) A mediator may not be
compelled to provide evidence of a mediation communication referred to in
subsection (a)(6) or (b)(2). (d) If a mediation communication is not privileged
under subsection (a) or (b), only the portion of the communication necessary
for the application of the exception from nondisclosure may be admitted.
Admission of evidence under subsection (a) or (b) does not render the evidence,
or any other mediation communication, discoverable or admissible for any
other purpose.
UMA, supra note 28, at § 6.
187. Walsh, supra note 63, at 18.
188. Edward F. Sherman, Court-Mandated Alternative Dispute Resolution: What Form of
Participation Should Be Required?, 46 SMU L. REV. 2079, 2094–111 (1993).
189. Carol M. Werner et al., Commitment, Behavior, and Attitude Change: An Analysis of
Voluntary Recycling, 15 J. ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 197 (1996) (finding that those who signed a contract to
commit to recycling were more likely to participate, and likely to participate more than once, in a
recycling program than those who simply agreed verbally in person to participate).
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9. Let the court decide what to do with information on the mediation
form rather than have mediators recommend a particular course of
action. The court should determine whether it wants to find bad faith if
necessary parties do not appear after the one allowable, excused
rescheduling. If the court wants to find bad faith for necessary parties
not appearing, then it should make that determination, not the
mediator.190

Element 2 Accountability: Document Exchange
Should Be Responsibility of Non-mediator
Mediator May Have Limited Responsibility
In non-foreclosure mediations, it is common for the court or the
mediator to require some document exchange in preparation for the
negotiation process. This is simply due diligence. The challenge in
foreclosure situations is that each loan and each modification option has a
different set of documents required for an application, and each borrower
has a different set of circumstances that may require different documents.
So, even if programs create a standardized list of the most commonly
requested documents, it would not be sufficient for most loan modification
applications or borrower circumstances. Rather than coming up with an
incomplete list to be exchanged before or during mediation and to be used in
evaluations of party participation, the program process should support open
communication about document exchange before, during, and after
mediation sessions.
1. Work with servicers to improve the communication systems available
to borrowers prior to and during the foreclosure process.191 Per the $26
billion settlement in 2012 between forty-nine states’ attorneys general
and five major banks, servicers should designate a contact person for
each borrower so the borrower can make phone calls and e-mails to one
person and be assured of reaching someone who can communicate about

190. Lande, supra note 55, at 84–85; David S. Winston, Participation Standards in Mandatory
Mediation Statutes: “You Can Lead a Horse to Water. . . .,” 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 187,
201 (1996).
191. SHAH, supra note 85, at 4, 15.
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his or her case.192 This would relieve some of the initial frustrations in
the mediation process that stunt open communication between borrower
and servicer and lead to what some see as bad faith communication.
2. Courts or government agencies could require servicers, prior to
mediation, to provide proof that: (1) the servicer is the entity responsible
for enforcing the mortgage, and (2) the borrower is actually delinquent
on the mortgage. These two showings are the basic requirements for
property cases that, in the deluge of foreclosure cases, are sometimes
ignored.193 This gap leads housing advocates to call for documentation
of these two showings in mediation.
The court makes these
determinations, not the mediator or the mediation administrator. 194
Though potentially onerous, these two threshold legal questions should
be decided prior to any mediation.
3. Use housing counselors to make document preparation less
burdensome for borrowers195 and more complete for servicers. Housing
counselors can also explain the concepts that confuse the borrowers,
leading to more educated borrowers going into the mediation. Housing
counselors can also help borrowers gather paperwork needed for a
HAMP loan modification. Perhaps most importantly, they can help
borrowers assess what amount of money they can afford to put toward
housing costs.
4. Require a pre-mediation session without the mediator to discuss
documents needed for that particular case. This could be done by
phone, if necessary. Although this will not resolve all document
questions, it will help the official mediation process retain its character
as a forum for discussing options. Pre-mediation sessions should not

192. Nelson D. Schwartz, Some Doubt a Settlement Will End Mortgage Ills, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
20, 2012, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/21/business/some-doubt-asettlement-will-end-mortgage-ills.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
193. See Thomas J. Sheeran, Ohio Case Might Add to Lender Problems, ASSOC. PRESS, Nov.
16, 2007, available at http://www.ohio.com/news/nation/ohio-case-might-add-to-lender-problems1.70387. This is an exception rather than the norm.
194. Contra Walsh, supra note 63, at VII.
195. Thomas Grillo, Mayor Calls for Mediation Before Foreclosure, BOSTON HERALD, Dec.
10,
2010,
http://bostonherald.com/business/real_estate/2010/12/mayor_calls_mediation_foreclosure.
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include an evaluation of whether the case is “good” for mediation; this
should happen prior to a pre-mediation session.196
5. Create document exchange requirements flexible enough to allow
modification for legitimate hardships or confusion on the part of either
party.
6. Create an educational sheet defining foreclosure language and
describing some of the different loan modification options. Parties may
reference this sheet in mediation. Programs should ensure that the
information referenced in the sheet comes from a neutral, reliable
source.
7. Have the governing entity, not the mediator, review compliance with
a requirement that the servicer provide a reason for a loan modification
denial. 197 The mediator should not be in the position to judge any
document exchange as sufficient or insufficient, or to evaluate document
accuracy.198
Element 3 Accountability: Good Faith Participation
Should Never Be Responsibility of Mediator
Courts and the UMA are clear; mediation programs deem lack of
attendance, lack of settlement authority, and lack of providing the required
pre-mediation paperwork to be bad faith. 199 So, how can foreclosure
mediation programs increase the likelihood that parties will willingly
participate in the process and also preserve the role of the mediator?
196. This would greatly slow down the process and result in far fewer mediations occurring.
See, e.g., Now We’re Talking, supra note 180; See Walk the Talk, supra note 57, at 19.
197. See, e.g., Maryland’s Foreclosure Mediation Program, which requires lenders to evaluate
the loan modification application and provide a response in writing prior to proceeding to any
mediation.
Maryland’s Foreclosure Mediation, MARYLAND, THE HOPE INITIATIVE,
http://mdhope.dhcd.maryland.gov/ForeclosureMediation/Pages/default.aspx (last visited June 6,
2014).
198. Steve Kanigher, In Nevada, a Fight over Foreclosure Paperwork, LAS VEGAS SUN, Oct.
25, 2010, http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2010/oct/25/fighting-over-foreclosure-paperwork/
(citing a mediator who rejects the speculation that mediators should review documents and
reiterating that document review is the realm of the judge, not the mediator).
199. Lande, supra note 55, at 86; Hunt v. Woods, 1996 WL 8037 (6th Cir. 1996); Nick v.
Morgan’s Foods, 99 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (E.D. Mo. 2000), aff’d 270 F.3d 590 (8th Cir. 2001); In re
Acceptance Insurance Co., 33 S.W.3d 443 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000); Graham v. Baker, 447 N.W.2d 397
(Iowa 1989); Decker v. Lindsay, 824 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
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Thoughtful program design, monitoring, and evaluation will put into place a
structure to support voluntary good faith participation without requiring the
mediator to jeopardize his neutrality.
1. Involve all organizational stakeholder groups in the creation of
mediation programs.200 This will lessen the likelihood that one party
will be resentful of the process, and thus less likely to participate
willingly. This also mitigates, as much as possible, one party’s
resentment over having to go to a program in which they have no say. It
also helps court administrators, judges, bank employees, servicer
attorneys, legal aid attorneys, housing advocates, and borrowers build
rapport before they enter tense situations.201
2. Rely on the judge’s or other authority figure’s determination that the
servicer foreclosed properly202 instead of relying on the mediator to
make such findings herself.203 This inquiry is different than whether the
servicer participates in the mediation in good faith, and it is proper only
for the courts to decide.
3. Ensure the judge or government agency educates parties about
expectations in mediation—good faith, self-determination, and
confidentiality—at the beginning of the court process and when the case
is referred to mediation. In Connecticut, this occurs in the judge’s
order.204 The judge can also ensure the parties receive oral instruction
about expectations in mediation at any court appearance. The mediator
should also clearly explain the process and good faith participation
expectations to parties at the beginning of the first mediation session.
Clearly identified goals for the mediation will set those goals in the
parties’ minds and will give the mediator a reference point should the
mediation head in a “bad faith” direction.205

200. Resolution on Good Faith, supra note 167, at 4.
201. Id. at 4-5.
202. See, e.g., U.S. Bank Nat’l Assn. v. Mathon, No. 2007-30481, 2010 WL 4910164, at *5
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 1, 2010).
203. Contra, e.g., U.S. Bank Nat’l Assn. v. Mathon, No. 2007-30481, 2010 WL 4910164, at *5
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 1, 2010).
204. Uniform Foreclosure Mediation Standing Orders, STATE OF CONN. SUP. CT. (2010),
available at http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/super/Standorders/Civil/FMP_010510.pdf.
205. See id.
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4. Explain during referral (judge) and at the beginning of mediation
(mediator) that there is no pressure to settle and that if the mediation
does not result in a settlement, the parties have the right to go before the
judge. This relieves parties from feeling like they have to consider
every option (at risk of being judged to be in bad faith) and empowers
them to decline options that do not make sense. Negotiation is about
considering options that meet needs, not considering a laundry list of
options.206
5. Do not force parties to talk about specific options; trust the mediator’s
skill to help parties make their own determination about what is in their
best interest to discuss. In the interest of exploring many loan
modification options, some courts want to require mediators to report on
whether the servicer considered options in good faith. However,
because confidentiality protects the mediation process from disclosure,
the court cannot force the parties to communicate about specific options.
Neither can mediators, who are neutral, require parties to consider
particular options. A mediator can ask questions to get the servicer and
borrower thinking about what a court might require: proof that a
borrower applied for HAMP, explanation of a denial, documentation to
support a denial, etc. A mediator can also ask questions of the borrower
to see if they understand an explanation about the denial.207
6. Train mediators to ask probing, yet unbiased, questions. Training
also helps mediators level the playing field to avoid abuse and to check
their own prejudices at the door.208 Mediators should also be trained in
loan modification language and options, so they can ask questions that
may help the parties discuss more serious alternatives to foreclosure.209
7. Build in accountability measures (i.e., pro bono counsel) for the
borrowers and counsel for the servicer in the mediation room. While
mediators can help guide the process of mediation, they cannot and
should not replace counsel as the guard against misconduct, especially if
206. Walk the Talk, supra note 57, at 10, 12.
207. Some programs, like Vermont’s, require lenders to provide a written reason for denying a
loan modification. This decision should be the realm of the courts; if the courts require production
of such a document, it should be done in a housing counseling session or in formal court
proceedings. See, e.g., SHAH, supra note 85, at 12. The mediator should not require any party to
produce any documentation, as the mediation is not an official discovery process. See, e.g., SHAH,
supra note 85, at 12. The mediator should not require any party to produce any documentation, as
the mediation is not an official discovery process.
208. Walk the Talk, supra note 57, at 12.
209. See Walsh, supra note 63, at 19.
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the mediators are attorneys themselves.210 Parties or their attorneys
should be the ones to report misconduct to the court.211 In the ABA
Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, attorneys have an ethical obligation to report
the misconduct of other attorneys. 212 Many states do not expressly
require reporting, but allow it and privilege it.213 To have this type of
accountability, though, programs need to supply pro bono counsel to
self-represented borrowers.214
8. Ensure program administrators review each mediation session with
the mediator and discuss any issues that arose.
Because this
conversation is between two people from the same dispute resolution
program, the conversation is still confidential in most states. The
benefit: it allows mediators to vent about frustrations and decreases the
temptation to report “bad” behavior to the court. Also, this process
assists with better program development; if the program identifies
problems, consider how to design the system differently to counter
negative participation.215
9. Be wary of using subjective terms to describe behavior. Some
suggest the court or legislature define what “good faith” means. 216
However, defining “good faith,” which would likely involve more
210.
211.
212.

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.4 (1983).
NATIONAL STANDARDS, supra note 155, at 12.3.
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-103(A) (1980); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (1983).
213. See, e.g., San Diego Cnty. Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 1992-2 (1992),
available at http://www.sdcba.org/index.cfm?Pg=ethicsopinion92-2 (California); Colo. Bar Ass’n
Ethics Comm., Op. 64 Duty of Attorney to Report an Ethical Violation (1983) (rev. 1996), available
at http://www.cobar.org/repository/Ethics/FormalEthicsOpion/FormalEthicsOpinion_64_2011.pdf
(Colorado); State Bar of Ariz. Ethics Comm., Op. 90-13 (Oct. 16, 1990), available at
http://www.azbar.org/Media/_Ethics/90-13.pdf (Arizona, discussing Illinois case).
214. Increasingly, program advocates believe that having representation for the homeowners is
necessary for program success. John Schwartz, Judges Berate Bank Lawyers in Foreclosure, N.Y.
TIMES,
Jan.
11,
2011,
at
A1,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/11/business/11lawyers.html?pagewanted=all.
215. Lande, supra note 55, at 76.
216. A Homeowner’s Guide to Foreclosure Mediation, NW. JUSTICE PROJECT (Oct. 2011),
available
at
http://www.walawhelp.com/documents/4993016212EN.pdf?stateabbrev=/WA/
(enumerating what it means for both sides to participate in good faith); Jesse D. Stewart, Maine’s
Foreclosure Mediation Program: What Should Constitute a Good Faith Effort to Mediate?,64 ME.
L. REV. 249 (2011) (recommending that Maine’s foreclosure mediation program “empower[]
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subjective terminology like “reasonable” or “congenial,” seems as
productive as allowing mediators to make subjective determinations
about what “good faith” means. Indeed, only one of twenty-three
jurisdictions that listed “good faith” requirements in mediation statutes
actually defined what “good faith” means.217 Sanctions, like laws, are
meant to change specific bad behavior and promote specific good
behavior. Therefore, only clear, objective criteria should be used to
sanction bad behavior in mediations. If anyone is to determine what is
sanctionable, it should be the courts, not mediators.218
10. Do not call the process mediation or call the neutrals mediators if
the
neutral is reporting on bad faith participation.219 The Providence and
Philadelphia programs called the process conciliation to avoid the
connotations that come with mediation. However, programs must
decide if reporting on bad faith is a higher priority than using actual
mediators and conducting professional mediation sessions.
11. Develop a monitoring system to track satisfaction with the
mediation process from parties and the mediator. This will help
programs flag any reoccurring feedback and make adjustments in the
process as needed.
12. Conduct a thorough evaluation of the program’s operations,
including whether the chosen process is preserving the core values of
mediation.
VI. CONCLUSION
Mediation program developers perform a balancing act. They must
determine the goals of the program and the public policies governing it,
weigh the interests of its stakeholders, and comply with various statutory,
administrative, and professional standards. As the foreclosure mediation
context demonstrates, these factors often conflict.
Mediation confidentiality and neutrality are sometimes at odds with
measures meant to hold parties accountable for participating fairly in the
mediators and judges to carefully monitor the mortgagee’s good faith at mediation based on clear,
predictable, and realistic criteria” such as how the NPV is conducted and what documents are
exchanged).
217. Lande, supra note 55, at 80.
218. Resolution on Good Faith, supra note 167, at 2.
219. Walk the Talk, supra note 57, at 11.
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mediation process. The need for courts to ensure just processes may mean
they do not interfere with much of the mediation process. In the midst of
these seemingly incompatible characteristics, however, courts can develop
foreclosure mediation programs that serve borrowers, servicers, and the
justice system well. Specifically, foreclosure mediation developers should
carefully consider how the program’s mediator reporting requirements might
conflict with mediator ethical rules.
First, courts can hold parties accountable for attending the mediation.
Attendance is the basic requirement for borrowers and servicers to
communicate about alternatives to foreclosure. Without a mechanism to
enforce attendance, foreclosure mediation programs lose their primary
strength: communication between two parties in conflict, facilitated by a
skilled third-party neutral.
However, courts, not mediators, should
determine what sanctions are appropriate for non-attendance. Mediators
should allow exceptions for unforeseen circumstances in the event of urgent
changes to the parties’ schedules.
Second, courts can monitor document exchange as part of a premediation or post-mediation court process. However, even if mediation
serves as a forum for document exchange, the courts cannot review what is
exchanged. Mediators are most effective when they can ask questions about
the documents presented, rather than serving as a go-between for document
exchange. To prepare for the mediation, courts can require a pre-mediation
conference where parties communicate about what documents they must
bring before considering alternatives to foreclosure. Conference facilitators
should ask questions about documents and facilitate both parties’ greater
understanding of the foreclosure and any alternative process, including
mediation.
Third, foreclosure mediation program developers should ensure they are
familiar with mediator ethical guidelines. Some provisions strictly prohibit
mediators from reporting on a party’s level of participation in the mediation
process. Even if the state’s guidelines do not prohibit such reporting,
developers should weigh whether preserving confidentiality and neutrality
for all mediations or reporting a few rogue parties is more important to the
program. Good faith is a difficult concept to define, let alone objectively
judge.
Fourth, by monitoring the overall program, courts can determine if there
are ongoing issues that need to be addressed. Effective monitoring requires
receiving input from all participants, including mediators and parties.
Having regular mediator meetings adds an additional layer of program
monitoring beyond written survey forms. Once there is sufficient data, a
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more thorough evaluation could demonstrate how the program is working
relative to its stated goals and values.
Foreclosure mediation development requires a thoughtful group of
people to determine the best way to balance competing goals. Once begun,
programs must also subject themselves to rigorous evaluation. Monitoring,
collecting data, and evaluating the process will keep the initially set out
values in check. Only by involving interested parties at all stages of
program development will foreclosure mediation programs ensure the core
values of the mediation process serve to relieve the foreclosure crisis.
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